Privacy, Crime Control and Police Use of Automated Facial Recognition Technology by Purshouse, Joe & Campbell, Liz
 1 
 
Privacy, Crime Control and Police use of Automated Facial 
Recognition Technology (8831 words) 
 
Joe Purshouse 
Lecturer in Criminal Law, University of East Anglia 
Liz Campbell 
Professor and Francine McNiff Chair in Criminal Jurisprudence, Monash University 
 
This paper discusses the police use of automated facial recognition technology (FRT) 
as a tool of crime control and public space surveillance. It considers the legality of the 
police use of FRT in England and Wales, with particular reference to the fundamental 
rights of those who have been subject to criminal process. Drawing on relevant privacy 
and criminal law scholarship, this paper argues that inadequate protection has been 
afforded to the privacy rights, and other human rights of those subject to police FRT 
surveillance in public space in England and Wales. We therefore suggest that, if FRT 




Over the last year, in England and Wales, FRT has been used at a number of crowded 
events to identify suspects and prevent crime. This technology is purportedly more 
valuable operationally than ordinary public Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 
surveillance as it can identify individuals in real time and link them to other information 
stored on police databases. FRT involves the identification of an individual based on 
an analysis of the geometric features of his or her face, and a comparison between the 
algorithm created from the captured image and one already stored, such as from a 
custody image or social media account. It has numerous private and public sector 
applications.1 Essentially, FRT deploys software to compare a collected image of an 
individual’s face (as taken from a CCTV surveillance camera, for example) to facial 
images in a previously assembled database (henceforth, a “watch list”) with the aim of 
                                                        
1 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Automated Facial Recognition in the Public and 
Private Sectors (Gatineau, QC, 2013), p.1. 
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gaining a match between a face on the database and the more recently collected image.2 
FRT’s commercial applications range from enabling more effective photo sharing on 
social media sites by identifying faces on images uploaded to platforms such as 
Facebook and Instagram and linking these to user profiles, through to authenticating 
employees to access secure premises such as a power plant or prison.3 Buolamwini and 
Gebru note that the capacity of FRT to move beyond mere face detection and towards 
the identification of emotions and personality characteristics is also increasing rapidly 
and becoming more precise (although such developments remain in their infancy).4 
FRT even holds the potential to ascertain a person’s sexuality.5 
 
Advances in FRT also have numerous criminal justice and policing applications, and 
this technology is becoming increasingly popular for police forces across the world. 
Where successful, such applications often have headline-grabbing effects.6 FRT has 
been trialled by a handful of domestic police forces looking to position themselves at 
the leading edge of technology-led crime control practice. In England and Wales, FRT 
cameras have been used predominantly in the context of public surveillance operations 
at large gatherings such as outdoor festivals, sports events or public protests.7 Though 
other applications of FRT may be utilised by the police in the future, which would 
undoubtedly raise significant practical and principled issues, these will not be 
considered here. In the interests of developing sharper focus, the following analysis is 
                                                        
2  L.D. Introna and H. Nissenbaum, Facial Recognition Technology: A Survey of Policy and 
Implementation Issues (Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response, 2009), p.11.  
3 A.P. Cackley, Facial Recognition Technology: Commercial Uses, Privacy Issues, and Applicable 
Federal Law (US Government Accountability Office, 2015), p.3. 
4 J. Buolamwini and T. Gebru, “Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial 
Gender Classification” (Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, New York, NY, 
2018), p.2. 
5 Y. Wang and M. Kosinski, “Deep neural networks are more accurate than humans at detecting sexual 
orientation from facial images” (2018) 114 J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 246. 
6 Recently, police in India suggested that the roll out of FRT across New Delhi enabled them to identify 
3,000 missing children in just four days. See A. Cuthbertson, “Indian Police trace 3,000 Missing Children 
In Just Four Days Using Facial Recognition Technology” (April 24, 2018), Independent.co.uk, 
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/india-police-missi ng-children-facial-
recognition-tech-trace-find-reunite-a8320406.html; “Chinese man caught by facial recognition at pop 
concert” (April 13, 2018), BBC.co.uk, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-43751276 
[Accessed August 7, 2018].  
7 “Three arrested using facial recognition technology during Wales’ Six Nations opener” (February 6, 
2018), Walesonline.co.uk, https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/three-arrested-using-facial-
recognition-14253344 [Accessed August 4, 2018]; V. Dodd, “Met police to use facial recognition 
software at Notting Hill carnival” (August 5, 2017), Theguardian.co.uk, 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/aug/05/met-police-facial-recognition-software-notting-
hill-carnival [Accessed August 7, 2018].  
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limited to the police use of FRT at public gatherings. Additionally, as a matter of path 
clearing, to maintain the tight focus, the evidential value of FRT surveillance footage 
and fair trial rights will not be discussed. 
 
Those police forces to have trialled FRT claim of course that they are cognisant of 
human rights concerns, and of the need to ensure that the use of this technology is 
lawful and proportionate. 8  This article questions this claim. It provides a fuller 
understanding of how FRT interferes with human rights, with particular emphasis on 
the right to respect for private life under art.8 European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). It then considers the extent to which the use of FRT in the context of public 
surveillance in England and Wales is lawful, and indeed the extent to which the law 
should permit the police to engage in this form of surveillance at public gatherings.  
 
The FRT Surveillance Trials  
Three domestic police forces have “trialled” FRT to monitor public spaces: 
Leicestershire Police, South Wales Police (SWP) and the Metropolitan Police Service 
(MPS). The term “trial” in this context is a catchall term to describe various usages of 
FRT surveillance, and, as will be explored below, some trials are expansive with no 
defined end point or proposed measurement of success. Rather than pilots or tests, they 
seem to form part of an inevitable drive towards wider adoption of this technology. 
Leicestershire Police was the first force to begin using FRT to police public gatherings 
in the UK in April 2014, as part of a six-month trial of the ‘Neoface’ facial recognition 
system. Most famously, the force used the technology to identify “known offenders” 
among the 90,000 attendees at the Download festival in June 2015. The watch list 
comprised custody images held by the force, and images provided by Europol. 9 
However, the results of the trial in terms of the accuracy of the technology and 
outcomes of any identifications remain unpublished.  
 
                                                        
8  “Introduction of Facial Recognition into South Wales Police” (South Wales Police, 2018), 
https://www.south-wales.police.uk/en/news-room/introduction-of-facial-recognition-into-south-wales-
police/ [Accessed August 6, 2018].  
9 P. Gallagher, “Download Festival: Facial recognition technology used at event could be coming to 
festivals nationwide” (June 12, 2015), Independent.co.uk: https://www.independent. 
co.uk/news/uk/crime/download-festival-facial-recognition-technology-used-at-event-could-be-coming-
to-festivals-10316922.html [Accessed July 30, 2018]. 
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The MPS first used FRT at the Notting Hill Carnival in 2016, and aims to complete ten 
trials of its system by the end of 2018.10 It has a bespoke facial recognition system. The 
trial in 2016 resulted in no successful identifications, and just one successful 
identification at the 2017 Notting Hill Carnival; in 2017 the system also misidentified 
five carnival goers as constituting wanted individuals, who were subject to a brief stop 
by police as a result of the “false positive” match.11 These individuals were subject to 
stops despite the efforts of the MPS to reduce the risk of misidentification by adopting 
a two-step verification process, whereby any matches are checked by a human operator 
before being passed to patrolling officers in the vicinity of the monitored public space.12 
The MPS trialled their system for a third time on Remembrance Sunday 2017, again 
making one positive identification to a person on a watch list. This trial was particularly 
controversial as the MPS compiled and used a watch list of “fixated individuals”, who 
were identified as having obsessive tendencies towards certain public figures but were 
not wanted in connection with any specific offence. According to The Independent, the 
MPS’s use of the technology in 2018 in Stratford yielded no arrests.13  
 
SWP is the national lead on FRT, having received a £2.6 million Government grant to 
test the technology.14 SWP deployed Neoface’s FRT system at 18 public gatherings 
between May 2017 and March 2018, and has no set end date for its trial of FRT. Big 
Brother Watch raised concerns about the accuracy of the technology during these trials, 
noting that a “staggering 91% of matches—2,451—incorrectly identified innocent 
members of the public.”15 SWP has defended its continued use of FRT, publishing 
                                                        
10 Big Brother Watch, Face Off: The lawless growth of facial recognition in UK policing (London, 2018), 
p.26. 
11 A false positive match occurs where a FRT system mistakenly matches a person passing under a facial 
recognition camera to an image on the watch list. Big Brother Watch, Face Off: The lawless growth of 
facial recognition in UK policing, p.26. 
12 Facial identification is most accurate when both algorithms and so called “super-recognisers” (humans 
who are particularly adept at face identification) work in collaboration: see P. Phillips et al, “Face 
recognition accuracy of forensic examiners, super-recognizers, and face recognition algorithms” (2018) 
115 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 6171. However, there is no legal prerequisite for the MPS to use super-
recognisers when crosschecking FRT matches, and this is not common practice: see G. Edmond and N. 
Wortley, “Interpreting Image Evidence: Facial Mapping, Police Familiars and Super-recognisers in 
England and Australia” (2016) 3 J.I.C.L. 473. 
13 “Facial recognition trial in London results in zero arrests, Metropolitan Police confirm” (July 3, 2018) 
Independent.co.uk, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/facial-recognition-police-uk-london-
trials-stratford-no-arrests-privacy-human-rights-false-positives-a8429466.html [Accessed August 1, 
2018]. 
14 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-transformation-fund-successful-bids-2016-to-
2017 [Accessed August 1, 2018]. 
15 Big Brother Watch, Face Off: The lawless growth of facial recognition in UK policing, p.29. 
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information that 2,297 of these false positives occurred at a single event, the June 2017 
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Champions League Final, where the 
technology was being trialled by the SWP for the first time and poor quality images 
provided by UEFA had been used to populate the watch list.16 This might explain the 
high false positive rate at the Champions League Final, which was claimed to be an 
anomaly, but it raises further questions about the quality of the laws in place regulating 
the population of watch lists. A closer look at the data published by SWP reveals that, 
even when the Champions League Final is removed from the dataset, false positive 
matches still outnumber true positive matches by 154 to 106.  
 
Although FRT is becoming more pervasive in the force areas that have trialled it, we 
still do not have much published data with which to evaluate its accuracy, and the 
positive contribution it can make towards the policing objectives. Each trialling police 
force claims to have made numerous arrests after successful identifications. However, 
these arrests appear to be far outweighed by the number of false positive matches, 
presenting a risk that any crime prevention successes will come at the expense of the 
rights of innocent people who may be subject to stops and other coercive policing 
measures. In July 2018, Big Brother Watch applied to the High Court for a judicial 
review of the MPS’s use of FRT surveillance. The remaining sections of this analysis 
explore unsettled questions of principle and practice pertaining to the regulation of FRT 
surveillance. The aim of this exercise is not to speculate on the prospects of success for 
any legal challenges to the police use of FRT surveillance in public space, but to 
consider the extent to which human rights considerations should serve as a constraint 
on the police use of FRT at public gatherings. 
  
Is the use of FRT Surveillance Convention Compliant? 
In Wood,17 the Court of Appeal attempted to set out the relevant tests underlying the 
scope of the powers of the police to subject individuals to overt public surveillance. 
The claimant, a campaigner against the arms trade who was photographed by the police 
at a protest outside the Annual General Meeting of a company connected to the arms 
                                                        
16  “Facial Recognition” (South Wales Police, 2017), https://www.south-wales.police.uk/en/adv 
ice/facial-recognition-technology/ [Accessed August 7, 2018]. 
17  R. (on the application of Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2010] 1 W.L.R. 
123; [2010] E.M.L.R. 1; [2009] H.R.L.R. 25; [2009] A.C.D. 75. 
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trade, argued that the taking and retention of these photographs by the police violated 
his rights under arts 8, 10, 11 and 14 ECHR. The Court of Appeal held that the activities 
of the police had violated the claimant’s art.8 rights, allowing the claimant’s appeal. 
The Court dealt with the latter three articles briefly. On the rights to freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly under arts 10 and 11, and without elaborating 
much on his reasoning, Laws LJ observed that it was “fanciful to suppose that in the 
events which happened there was any interference with the claimant’s rights under arts 
10 and 11.”18 Laws LJ further held that there was no discrimination contrary to art.14 
as “the police had good reason, arising from their perception of events which was itself 
reasonable, to photograph the claimant.”19 The Court gave short shrift to any notion 
that these articles might be engaged through the surveillance, notwithstanding the 
claimant’s assertions that this surveillance had a corrosive and chilling effect on his 
future involvement in political activism.   
 
Turning to art.8, Tthis case set out some of the main features of the domestic courts’ 
approach to interpreting the scope of the human rights protection to be afforded to those 
subject to overt police surveillance in public spaces. It provides us with a useful 
reference point for assessing the extent to which the police’s use of FRT surveillance 
is compatible with their obligations to respect fundamental human rights. 
 
The majority held that held that the activities of the police constituted an interference 
with the claimant’s art.8 rights, but that this interference was not “necessary in a 
democratic society” under art.8(2).20 The majority expressed no conclusive view on 
whether the measures were “in accordance with the law” for the purposes of art.8(2). 
However, the majority held that the surveillance measures were disproportionate. In 
forming this conclusion, Dyson LJ emphasised that the police targeted the claimant in 
circumstances where he “had not been ejected from the meeting and … was not guilty 
of any misconduct” upon leaving.21  
 
                                                        
18 Wood [2010] 1 WLR 123, 150. 
19 Wood [2010] 1 WLR 123, 150. 
20 Wood [2010] 1 WLR 123, 150. 
21 Wood [2010] 1 WLR 123, 152. 
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Laws LJ dissented, holding that, whilst the surveillance activities of the police 
interfered with the claimant’s art.8(1) rights,  on the point of whether the interference 
was justified under art.8(2), observing that it was. However, Laws LJ’s dissent provided 
a considered breakdown of the tests that need to be applied to determine whether there 
has been an interference with art.8(1).  
 
Laws LJ first described personal autonomy as the central value protected by art.8(1).22 
However, Laws LJ warned that there exist three safeguards for ensuring that the core 
values protected by art.8 are not interpreted so widely that its claims become unreal or 
unreasonable. 23  These are as follows: 1) a measure threatening or assaulting the 
individual’s right must attain a “certain level of seriousness” for art.8 to be engaged; 2) 
the “touchstone” for art.8(1)’s engagement is whether the claimant enjoys on the facts 
a “reasonable expectation of privacy”; and 3) the breadth of art.8(1) may be curtailed 
by the scope of the justifications available to the state pursuant to art.8(2).24 
 
In finding that there was in fact an interference with art.8(1), Laws LJ characterised the 
activities of the police in taking and retaining photographs as part of a surveillance 
operation as “a good deal more than the snapping of a shutter”, as they involved the 
storing and processing of personal information, and were targeted specifically towards 
the claimant.25 Dyson LJ, in the majority, agreed.  
 
However, on the art.8(2) point, Laws LJ departed from the majority’s position, 
observing that, as the taking of the claimant’s image was not done in an aggressive 
manner, and the retention of his image was “tightly controlled”, the activities of the 
police were proportionate and “necessary in a democratic society”.Dyson LJ 
determined that the activities of the police were disproportionate and in violation of 
                                                        
22 Wood [2010] 1 WLR 123, 135 at [21]. 
23 Wood [2010] 1 WLR 123, 135. 
24 Wood [2010] 1 WLR 123, 135. 
25 Wood [2010] 1 WLR 123 at [45]. 
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What rights are engaged by FRT surveillance? 
At first glance, Wood might look like a victory for those concerned in the protection of 
the human rights of individuals subject to overt police surveillance. However, Laws 
LJ’s pivotal interpretation of the scope of the human rights protection for those subject 
to public surveillance is unduly narrow. In elevating the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” standard to a touchstone test of art.8 engagement, Laws LJ significantly 
restricted the availability of the art.8 protection for those subject to surveillance as they 
traverse public space. As has been discussed extensively in academic commentary,28 
the elevation of this test in English law—which has since been affirmed as the correct 
approach by the Supreme Court29—diverts focus away from whether or not the police 
use of chilling and intrusive surveillance measures is lawful and proportionate.  
 
This interpretation of the scope of art.8(1) is also out of step with more recent European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, where the Strasbourg Court has found that 
art.8 is engaged without  entering into a detailed analysis of whether the applicant held 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstancesmention of the reasonable 
expectation standard.30 Rather, when developing the normative content of the right to 
respect for private life, the ECtHR’s key focus has been on the degree to which a 
particular measure sets back the privacy related interests of the applicant.31 Where the 
ECtHR does mention an applicant’s reasonable expectations of privacy (or lack thereof) 
as part of its art.8(1) inquiry, it seems to simply declare simply that such expectations 
exist rather than use the reasonable expectation test as an empirically verifiable standard 
of art.8 engagement. The existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy is certainly 
not a mandatory precondition for art.8 engagement in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.32 
Indeed, in Barbulescu, the ECtHR left open the question of whether the applicant held 
a reasonable expectation of privacy where his employer surreptitiously monitored his 
personal communications on a device which the employer had provided to him, but 
held that the applicant’s art.8 rights were nonetheless engaged owing to the intrusive 
nature of the employer’s activity.33 
 
Even on Laws LJ’s interpretation of the scope of art.8(1), however, the police use of 
FRT surveillance might interfere with art.8. Like the activities of the police in Wood, 
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FRT surveillance involves more than the “snapping of a shutter”. When finding an 
interference in Wood, the Court of Appeal noted that photography by a state authority 
as part of a surveillance operation would have a “chilling effect” on an individual’s 
activities in public space.34 The Court also drew support for this view from S and 
Marper, where the ECtHR determined that “the mere storing of data relating to the 
private life of the individual amounts to an interference within the meaning of Article 
8.”35  
 
Though there are contextual differences to note between the activities of the police in 
Wood and the FRT surveillance trials, the Court’s findings in Wood, with regard to the 
chilling effect of overt police surveillance and the processing of personal information 
seem to support the notion that public FRT surveillance interferes with art.8. After all, 
this technology does collect personally identifiable information from each individual to 
pass under its gaze and momentarily compares this with other personal information data 
held on police records. This is to subject the individual to much more than a passing 
glance. 
 
There is good reason for suggesting that individuals should be afforded the protection 
of art.8 when they are subject to FRT surveillance as they go about their business in 
public. Modern privacy scholarship generally acknowledges that individuals can retain 
an interest in privacy as they occupy public space.36 Larsen suggested that public CCTV 
moves the goalposts insofar as privacy in public is concerned, as it allows authorities 
to subject the individual to quite intensive scrutiny, breaking traditional boundaries and 
social conventions regarding the extent to which individuals would usually be subject 
to scrutiny when traversing public space.37  
 
                                                        
34 Wood [2010] 1 WLR 123 at [45] and [92] per Lord Collins. 
35  S and Marper v United Kingdom (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 50; [2009] Crim. L.R. 355 at [67]. This 
interpretation has been embraced by the Supreme Court, where Lord Sumption ruled that the state’s 
systematic collection and storage in retrievable form even of public information about an individual is 
an interference with private life. See R. (on the application of Catt) v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis [2015] UKSC 9; [2015] A.C. 1065; [2015] 2 W.L.R. 664; [2015] H.R.L.R. 4 at [5]. 
36 This is also a point that has been accepted by the ECtHR in Amann v Switzerland (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 
843 at [61], and, indeed, domestic courts: Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 A.C. 457; [2004] 2 W.L.R. 
1232; [2004] E.M.L.R. 15; [2004] H.R.L.R. 24. 
37 B. vS-T. Larsen, Setting the Watch: Privacy and the Ethics of CCTV Surveillance (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011), pp.41-55. 
 10 
 
FRT surveillance compounds the intrusive capacity of CCTV surveillance. Personally 
identifiable information is collected from the individual (namely, details of his or her 
facial geometry), and aggregated with other personally identifiable information (the 
image database) to create new information about the individual (that he or she is or is 
not a person of interest to the authorities). Thus, the technology allows the police to go 
further in transgressing social norms governing the flow of information about 
individuals as they occupy public space.  
 
Brey suggests that the processing of the biometric features of the one’s face in this way 
may violate an individual’s legitimately held privacy rights. Firstly, this is because the 
process of functionally reducing one’s face, which is a highly personal aspect of an 
individual’s uniqueness, to an information structure is dehumanising; and, secondly, 
“this process of functional reduction involves the creation of informational equivalents 
of body parts that exist outside their owner and are used and controlled by others.”38 
For Brey, through this process the individual loses full ownership of the geometric 
features of his or her face as these features acquire new meanings that the individual 
does not understand, and new uses realised outside of his or her own body.39  
 
Any data protection concerns of the citizen may be mitigated by the fact that the police 
delete processed images 30 days after their collection (provided a positive or false 
positive match is not made). It is unclear if speculative searches are run in this period, 
and how to guarantee that the images and algorithms are in fact deleted at the end of 
the timeframe. However, the shift in the balance of power between the state and the 
individual occupying public space is normatively significant in yet another way. As 
Cohen suggests, the mere presence of a public surveillance tool with such intrusive 
capabilities as FRT can threaten privacy interests by moderating behaviour:  
“The experience of being watched will constrain, ex ante, the acceptable spectrum 
of belief and behaviour. Pervasive monitoring of every first move or false start will, 
at the margin, incline choices toward the bland and the mainstream. The result will 
be a subtle yet fundamental shift in the content of our character, a blunting and 
blurring of rough edges and sharp lines. But rough edges and sharp lines have 
intrinsic, archetypal value within our culture. Their philosophical differences aside, 
the coolly rational Enlightenment thinker, the unconventional Romantic dissenter, 
the skeptical pragmatist, and the iconoclastic postmodernist all share a deep-rooted 
                                                        
38 P. Brey, “Ethical Aspects of Facial Recognition Systems in Public Places” (2004) 2 J.I.C.E.S. 97, 107. 
39 Brey, “Ethical Aspects of Facial Recognition Systems in Public Places” (2004) 2 J.I.C.E.S. 97, 107. 
 11 
 
antipathy toward unreflective conformism. The condition of no-privacy threatens 
not only to chill the expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to 
dampen the force of our aspirations to it.”40 
 
Cohen articulates how such monitoring can have a corrosive impact on personal 
autonomy. Where the police, as a state authority, utilise technology to transcend social 
norms of acceptable observation and scrutiny in public it is not difficult to see how this 
might have a moderating effect on behaviour. As Benn puts it, sustained observation of 
an individual can be objectifying: “Finding oneself an object of scrutiny, as the focus 
of another’s attention, brings one to a new consciousness of oneself, as something seen 
through another’s eyes.”41 When “the other” is the state, such practices can be coercive. 
In short, the police use of FRT surveillance to monitor public spaces can be 
distinguished not only from being subject to the fleeting observations one might be 
subject to by a stranger in public space, but also from prolonged surveillance by police 
personnel, and the use of CCTV surveillance, which cannot limit the personal autonomy 
of the individual to the same extent. It is submitted that police FRT surveillance in 
public spaces has at least the potential to engage the art.8 rights of any member of the 
public to whom it is applied. Even if, contrary to the analysis above, individuals cannot 
be said to have a reasonable expectation that they will not be subjectbe free from to 
FRT surveillance as they traverse public space, the balance of privacy scholarship and 
ECtHR jurisprudence suggests that—both legally and morally—the state should justify 
its Thus FRT deployments must satisfyof FRT in compliance with the criteria in 
art.8(2). 
 
The police use of FRT raises broader principled concerns than the impact that it will 
have on an individual’s privacy. Cohen’s observations about the moderating effect that 
public surveillance can have on behaviour hint at another drawback of the police use of 
FRT surveillance: this invasion of privacy may have a “chilling effect” on public 
assemblies, freedom of expression, and the general use of public space, by certain 
communities and demographics in particular. Drawing on empirical research, Aston 
develops this argument in the context of political protest movements, suggesting that 
                                                        
40 J.E. Cohen, “Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object” (2000) 52 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1373, 1425-1426. 
41 S. Benn, “Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons” in J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Privacy: 
Nomos XIII (New York: Atherton Press, 1971), p.7. 
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overt surveillance can damage legitimate political mobilisations in public space by 
undermining the perceived legitimacy of protest groups and limiting their access to 
resources.42 These findings, which are supported by empirical research from the United 
States,43 suggest that the presence of visible surveillance at meetings and other political 
gatherings will reduce perceptions of legitimacy, and harm the efforts of such groups 
to be taken seriously and attract support from their target audiences.44 The reputational 
hit that political groups may take when they are subject to surveillance can also have a 
knock-on effect on resources and networks.45  
 
FRT surveillance has the potential to threaten an individual’s right to be free from 
discrimination in two separate ways. The first is dependent on who the police choose 
to target using FRT surveillance. As we have seen, when FRT surveillance is deployed 
at public gatherings, faces in the crowd are checked against a watch list. One problem 
with public FRT surveillance is the lack of transparency regarding the selection process 
for images to go onto a watch list. This led to criticisms that the police are unjustifiably 
discriminating in their use of FRT surveillance when it was reported that the MPS used 
FRT at Remembrance Sunday in 2017 to identify and eject individuals based on criteria 
related to their mental ill health.46  
 
Secondly, FRT might, through its relative inaccuracy as applied to different 
demographic groups, lead to members of some groups being misidentified and subject 
to coercive policing measures. One of the purported advantages of FRT surveillance is 
that it can bring objectivity to the exercise of identifying suspects or “persons of 
interest” in real time. Unlike the human eye, the software “does not see race, sex, 
orientation or age.”47 However, this truism masks the danger that this technology can 
reflect, produce and maintain biases in policing outcomes. In particular, the limited 
                                                        
42  V. Aston, “State surveillance of protest and the rights to privacy and freedom of assembly: a 
comparison of judicial and protestor perspectives” (2017) 8 E.J.L.T. 1, 10. 
43 A. Starr, L.A. Fernandez, R. Amster, L.J. Wood, and M.J. Caro, “Impacts of State Surveillance on 
Political Assembly and Association: A Socio-Legal Analysis” (2008) 31 Qual. Sociol. 251, 261. 
44 Aston, “State surveillance of protest and the rights to privacy and freedom of assembly: a comparison 
of judicial and protestor perspectives” (2017) 8 E.J.L.T. 1, 10. 
45 Starr, Fernandez, Amster, Wood, and Caro, “Impacts of State Surveillance on Political Assembly and 
Association: A Socio-Legal Analysis” (2008) 31 Qual. Sociol. 251, 258-259. 
46 Big Brother Watch, Face Off: The lawless growth of facial recognition in UK policing, p.15. 
47  See C. Garvie, A. Bedoya, and J. Frankle, “The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face 
Recognition in America” (Georgetown Law, Center on Privacy & Technology, 2016), p.57. 
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independent testing and research into FRT technology indicates that numerous FRT 
systems misidentify ethnic minorities and women at higher rates than the rest of the 
population.48  
 
Despite calls for rigorous testing on the performance of FRT systems from the scientific 
community,49 the police have not even recorded published how the technology has 
performed relative to the gender, ethnicity or age of those subject to its use.50 This risk 
of over-policing minority groups can be set in a context where black people are arrested 
at a rate three times higher than white people.51 There appears to be a credible risk that 
FRT technology will undermine the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of already over-
policed groups. This is not merely because the technology itself is more likely to 
wrongly identify those with darker skin, but also because—assuming custody images 
are to be routinely used to populate FRT databases—those with darker skin are likely 
to be disproportionately enrolled onto the comparator database. This will increase the 
probability that members of the public from black or other minority ethnic backgrounds 
will be mistakenly identified as “persons of interest” relative to their white counterparts. 
As David Lammy noted in his recent review into the treatment of black and minority 
ethnic individuals in the criminal justice system: “Grievances over policing tactics, 
particularly the disproportionate use of Stop and Search, drain trust in the CJS in BAME 
communities”.52  
 
In Wood, and then again in Catt, the domestic courts did not consider the broader human 
rights ramifications of overt surveillance for the individual and society.53 This is hardly 
                                                        
48 These disparities of performance across different demographic groups are believed to be attributable 
to the way FRT algorithms are “trained”, and the inherent difficulties in accurately recognising the facial 
features of some demographic groups. See B.F. Klare, M.J. Burge, J.C. Klontz, R.W. Vorder Bruegge, 
and A.K. Jain, “Face Recognition Performance: Role of demographic information” (2012) 7 T.I.F.S. 
1789, 1797; Buolamwini and Gebru, “Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in 
Commercial Gender Classification” (2018), p.12. 
49 Buolamwini and Gebru, “Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender 
Classification” (2018), pp.11-12. 
50 Big Brother Watch, Face Off: The lawless growth of facial recognition in UK policing, p.17. 
51 Home Office, Arrest statistics data tables: police powers and procedures year ending 31 March 2017 
(London: OGL, 2017). 
52 The Lammy Review, An independent review into the treatment of, and outcomes for, Black, Asian and 
Minority Ethnic individuals in the Criminal Justice System (2017), p.17. 
53 Wood [2010] 1 WLR 123, 150; Catt [2015] UKSC 9 at [26]-[27]. 
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surprising given the Ullah principle54 and the fact that the ECtHR has been reluctant to 
consider whether overt surveillance activities have struck at the essence of arts 10 and 
11.55 Instead, when discerning the scope of these rights, Strasbourg and domestic courts 
tend to focus on more direct forms of restriction by a public authority56 than on the 
broader, residual effects of surveillance measures. Neither domestic courts nor the 
ECtHR would be likely to indulge in an exhaustive analysis of the potential 
applicability of art.14 to those subject to FRT surveillance. Due to its relative 
inaccuracy, the technology may well fall within the scope of art.14 as a form of indirect 
discrimination, as it has a disproportionately adverse effect on certain demographic 
groups.57 However, as was noted in the ‘Belgian Linguistic’ case (No 2), art.14 “has no 
independent existence in the sense that under the terms of art.14 it relates solely to 
‘rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention’”.58 Art.14 plays a subordinate role: it 
is only applicable in circumstances that fall within the “ambit” of another Convention 
right.  
 
As Goodwin has noted, the ECtHR’s approach to non-discrimination issues has beenis 
hesitant: “the Strasbourg Court has continually placed itself and its jurisprudence 
behind developments in non-discrimination law at the Member State, international and 
European Community level.”59 It is often the case that when the principal Convention 
right is invoked almost any difference in treatment can be dealt with in that context, 
making an analysis of art.14 superfluous.60 In S and Marper, the Strasbourg Court took 
this approach. In finding a violation of the applicants’ art.8 rights, the ECtHR seemed, 
in its articulated reasoning, to attribute some weight to the suggestion from the 
applicants that the retention policies “led to the over-representation in the database of 
                                                        
54 “The duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: 
no more, but certainly no less.” R. (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26; 
[2004] 2 A.C. 323; [2004] 3 W.L.R. 23; [2004] H.R.L.R. 33; [2004] I.N.L.R. 381 at [20]. 
55 In Shimovolos, where the ECtHR did not consider the corrosive impact that data retention might have 
on the applicant’s art.11 rights, notwithstanding that the surveillance was directly related to his 
participation in a political rally.  See Shimovolos v Russia (2014) 58 E.H.R.R. 26; 31 B.H.R.C. 506.  
56 Such as the criminalisation for certain forms of expression and assembly (Müller v Switzerland (1988) 
13 E.H.R.R. 212 at [28]; Ezelin v France (1991) 14 E.H.R.R. 362 at [37]); and the exertion of pressure 
to compel someone to join an association contrary to his or her convictions (Young, James and Webster 
v United Kingdom (1981) 4 E.H.R.R. 38 at [57]).  
57 See DH v Czech Republic (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 3. 
58 ‘Belgian Linguistic’ case (No 2) (1968) 1 E.H.R.R. 252 at [9].  
59 M.E.A. Goodwin, “Taking on Racial Segregation: The European Court of Human Rights at a Brown 
v. Board of Education moment?” (2009) 170 Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis 93, 94. 
60 J. Gerards, “The Discrimination Grounds of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights” 
[2013] 13 H.R.L. Rev. 99, 100.  
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young persons and ethnic minorities, who have not been convicted of any crime.”61 In 
light of this reasoning, the ECtHR considered that it was not necessary to examine 
separately the applicants’ complaint that the DNA and fingerprint retention policies, 
which disproportionately affected young persons and ethnic minorities, violated 
art.14.62  
 
This exercise of considering under the art.8 heading broader human rights 
considerations than would typically fall under the scope of art.8, under the art.8 heading 
does little to advance legal certainty. However, a full discussion of whether or not it 
would be principled or practically sustainable to broaden the scope of arts 10, 11 and 
14 to include protection from the use of surveillance measures, which might chill their 
exercise, falls beyond the scope of this analysis. This does not mean that the chilling or 
discriminatory effects of FRT surveillance are irrelevant when assessing its impact 
from a fundamental human rights perspective. At the least, any such effects conceivably 
serve to exacerbate the art.8 interference arising from FRT surveillance.  
 
Is FRT surveillance “in accordance with the law”? 
One criticism of the FRT trials is that they have been operating in a legal vacuum. FRT 
is said to have no legal basis regulating its proper operational limits.63 The Home Office 
has responded to such concerns, claiming that three legal regimes have regulated the 
trials: the Data Protection Act 2018; the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice; and, 
relevant human rights principles. However, none of these regimes provide guidelines 
or rules specifically regulating the police use of FRT. Moreover, in its recent Biometrics 
Strategy, the Home Office acknowledged that the governance and oversight of FRT 
surveillance could be “strengthened further”.64 It seems that the question of whether 
this legal basis meets the Convention’s legality requirements would be a particular 
flashpoint in any judicial review of FRT surveillance.  
 
                                                        
61 S and Marper (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 50 at [124].  
62 S and Marper (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 50 at [129]. 
63 Big Brother Watch, Face Off: The lawless growth of facial recognition in UK policing, p.3. 




In Catt,65 Lord Sumption summarised relevant ECtHR principles concerning what is 
required of the “in accordance with the law” requirement for Convention compliance. 
In different circumstances the two applicants had personal information about their 
activities noted down and retained by the police as they occupied publicly accessible 
space. The Supreme Court ruled that whilst the retention practices in each case engaged 
art.8(1), they satisfied the criteria in art.8(2) (with Lord Toulson dissenting on this point 
in the case of the first applicant). Lord Sumption concluded that the measures were “in 
accordance with the law”, observing that the exercise of common law powers to collect 
and store information is subject to an “intensive regime of statutory and administrative 
regulation” under the Data Protection Act 1998, and various guidance documents on 
the management of police information.66  
 
Lord Sumption drew support for this conclusion from MM67 and T,68 which concerned 
the disclosure of criminal records information to potential employers. In each case, it 
was held that the storage of criminal record information cannot be “in accordance with 
the law” if the provisions for the storage had no clear scope; contained no safeguards 
against abuse or arbitrary treatment of individuals; or if the provisions lacked minimum 
safeguards governing the storage, usage, procedures for preserving integrity, and 
confidentiality of data.69 
 
Lord Sumption observed that the application of rules regulating the use of an interfering 
measure should be reasonably predictable:  
“The rules need not be statutory, provided that they operate within a framework of 
law and that there are effective means of enforcing them. Their application, 
including the manner in which any discretion will be exercised, should be reasonably 
predictable, if necessary with the assistance of expert advice. But except perhaps in 
the simplest cases, this does not mean that the law has to codify the answers to every 
possible issue which may arise. It is enough that it lays down principles which are 
capable of being predictably applied to any situation.”70 
 
                                                        
65 Catt [2015] UKSC 9. 
66 Lord Sumption cited principles 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 listed in Schedule 1 of the Data Protection Act 1998 
along with the Guidance on the Management of Police Information (2010), which is superseded by a 
2014 edition. 
67 MM v United Kingdom [2013] April 29, 2013. 
68 R. (on the application of T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2014] UKSC 35; [2015] 
A.C. 49; [2014] 3 W.L.R. 96; [2014] 4 All E.R. 159; [2014] 2 Cr. App. R. 24. 
69 MM [2013] April 29, 2013 at [195]. 
70 Catt [2015] UKSC 9 at [11].   
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Lord Sumption paid close attention to how the activities of the police accorded with the 
1998 Act, and how these provisions met the demands of art.8 more generally, 
concluding that English law’s combination of these elements met the requirements of 
the legality test under art.8.71 Police FRT surveillance then, like the retention practices 
at issue in Catt, should accord with current data protection regulations. Following the 
enactment of the 2018 Act, this means that a trialling police force should follow the 
Data Protection Principles to ensure that data cannot be obtained, retained or used by 
the police unless it is necessary for them to do so for a law enforcement purpose (i.e. to 
prevent, detect, investigate, or prosecute criminal offences).72 Additionally, as FRT 
involves the systematic monitoring of public spaces on a large scale, and the processing 
of biometric data, the police should undertake a Data Protection Impact Assessment 
(DPIA) before undertaking this form of information processing. DPIAs must describe 
the nature, scope, and purpose of the processing, but there is no requirement upon a 
police force to publish their DPIA.73 The original PIA for the MPS trial was reviewed 
by the Information Commissioner’s Office.74 The Code of Practice on the Management 
of Police Information provides guidance to ensure consistent procedures throughout the 
police service for obtaining, storing and sharing personal information.75 
 
Any use of FRT surveillance must also be considered against the Surveillance Camera 
Code of Practice, to which police must have regard under Protection of Freedoms Act 
2012 s.33. This Code of Practice contains 12 guiding principles, which require 
surveillance camera system operators to ensure that their use of a camera system has a 
legitimate purpose. Operators must put in place safeguards to ensure that such systems 
are used transparently, and that information is only collected, processed or retained in 
so far as this is necessary for the legitimate purpose.76  
 
It is not clear that this piecemeal regulatory framework would satisfy the foreseeability 
and accessibility requirements in art.8(2). Whilst the general principles governing the 
                                                        
71 Catt [2015] UKSC 9 at [12]. 
72 Data Protection Act 2018 s.31 
73 Information Commissioner’s Office, Data protection impact assessments (London: OGL, 2018).  
74https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/731
641/BFEG_minutes_-_05_June_2018.pdf [Accessed September 21, 2018], para.2.6. 
75 Home Office, Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information (NCPE, 2014), p.8. 




use of surveillance camera systems and the protection of personal data are accessible 
to the public, they do not seem to pass the test set out by Lord Sumption in Catt: they 
are not capable of being predictably applied to the use of the interfering measure. That 
is to say that, whilst the domestic legal framework, which covers surveillance camera 
systems and data protection generally, does require the police to consider points that 
are relevant to the regulation of FRT surveillance, it is doubtful that this framework sets 
out a clear scope specifically for the use of FRT surveillance. This is because none of 
these regulatory mechanisms seem to have been drafted with the police’s current or 
future use of FRT surveillance in mind.  
 
Consequently, the regulatory framework gives little indication or guidance as to the 
proper threshold at which inclusion on a watch list is lawful.77  Practices between 
trialling police forces have diverged, and the Information Commissioner has expressed 
concern about the absence of national-level coordination and a comprehensive 
governance framework to oversee FRT deployment.78 Most images used to populate 
watch lists are gathered from custody image databases. Though forces trialling public 
FRT surveillance have been keen to emphasise that these databases are populated with 
images that they are legally entitled to collect or retain, they have the discretion to 
include as many images on the watch list as they see fit. For example, in their trial of 
FRT surveillance, SWP have included not only the images of wanted suspects and 
missing persons, but also other “persons of interest”—a conspicuously indefinite 
phrase.79 There is also no legal prohibition on police forces taking images from the 
internet or public facing social media accounts for this purpose. 
 
There is a particular risk, here, that people with old and minor convictions, or even 
those with no convictions at all, may find themselves stigmatised through the 
deployment of FRT surveillance, which targets them. This risk is compounded by the 
lack of effective safeguards governing the collection and continued retention of custody 
images taken from people who come into contact with the police, but are not 
                                                        
77 London Policing Ethics Panel, Interim Report on Live Facial Recognition (2018), p.14 
78  E. Denham, “facial recognition technology and law enforcement” (Information Commissioner’s 
Office, May 14, 2018), Ico.org.uk, https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/blog-facial-
recognition-technology-and-law-enforcement/.  
79  “Introduction of Facial Recognition into South Wales Police” (South Wales Police, 2018), 
https://www.south-wales.police.uk/en/news-room/introduction-of-facial-recognition-into-south-wales-
police/ [Accessed August 6, 2018]. 
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subsequently convicted of an offence. In RMC,80 the High Court ruled that the legal 
framework regulating the retention of custody images taken from such non-convicted 
persons under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.64 was not compatible with 
art.8 ECHR. The Science and Technology Committee recently expressed concerns that 
a Home Office review81 of the framework—which recommended that such images only 
be considered for deletion upon request (and not subject to any automatic deletion)—
did not seem to go far enough to satisfy the requirements of art.8.82 
 
Added to this, as discussed above, forces have used other images provided by third 
parties such as Europol and UEFA. The SWP admitted that the low quality of some 
such images resulted in a high rate of false positives at the 2017 Champions League 
Final. This raises the question: what constitutes an acceptable standard of image quality 
for a police facial recognition system? The regulatory framework, as currently 
formulated, provides no answer.  
 
Is FRT surveillance “in pursuit of a legitimate aim” and “necessary in a democratic 
society”? 
FRT surveillance conducted in accordance with the new DPA 2018 principles will be 
done “in pursuit of a legitimate aim” for the purposes of art.8(2). Police FRT 
surveillance, which pursues a “law enforcement purpose” under the DPA 2018, is, if 
not by default then to a virtual certainty, for the “prevention of disorder or crime” or 
“in the interests of public safety” for art.8(2) purposes. For an interference to satisfy 
the final criterion in art.8(2) it must be “necessary in a democratic society”, meaning 
the interfering measure must respond to a “pressing social need” and be “proportionate 
to the legitimate aim pursued”.83 Ultimately, the final limb requires a consideration of 
whether the degree of the interference with the rights of those subject to FRT 
surveillance is greater than justifiable in achieving the aims of the trialling police forces. 
Put another way, when the detrimental impact of carrying out FRT surveillance is 
                                                        
80 R. (on the application of RMC and FJ) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2012] 1 W.L.R. 
3007; [2012] H.R.L.R. 26; [2012] A.C.D. 103 at [55]. 
81 Home Office, Review of the Use and retention of Custody Images (London: OGL, 2017). 
82 “Police unlawfully retaining custody images, claims Norman Lamb” (February 6, 2018), BBC.co.uk, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-42961025; House of Commons. Select Committee on Science 
and Technology, Biometrics strategy and forensic services: Fifth Report of Session 2017-19 (The 
Stationary Office, 2018) HC Paper No.800, pp.18-19.  
83 Olsson v Sweden (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 259 at [67]. 
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weighed against the crime prevention and public safety benefits that are accrued from 
carrying it out, is there a net gain in favour of using FRT surveillance?  
 
As we have established above, FRT surveillance in public gatherings has the potential 
to set back privacy related interests to a significant degree. This surveillance subjects 
members of the public to uninvited scrutiny and has the potential to chill the exercise 
of other fundamental human rights. It constitutes a serious interference with art.8(1) 
compared to other forms of overt surveillance. One problem with the recent FRT trials 
is that it is not easy to discern their purpose. SWP have suggested that their trials 
enabled them to validate the technology and build confidence amongst their officers in 
using the technology. 84  Running trials of the technology with simulated natural 
conditions could, at least partially, enhance these objectives. Similarly, the London 
Policing Ethics Panel criticised the MPS for citing the need to test the technology in 
natural conditions as a reason for undertaking their trials:  
“If the argument is that [FRT] must be tested in natural conditions, a better 
justification for trialling it on the public at large would have been that all options for 
testing and refining it in simulated natural conditions had been exhausted. The MPS 
has not presented this claim to the public.”85 
 
Where the police are trialling the technology on the general public in live policing 
operations as a means of testing whether the technology works, without exhausting less 
intrusive options for testing the technology in a simulated environment, this use does 
not respond to a “pressing social need”. 
 
Another aim of the trials has been to use the technology to effectively to prevent crime 
and ensure public safety. In Bank Mellat, Lord Reed explained that the proportionality 
test requires a public authority to show that the legitimate aims of the legislature are 
logically furthered by the means it has chosen to adopt.86 Thus, to justify any continued 
use of FRT surveillance, the trials should enable the police to successfully gauge that 
this surveillance can contribute to its crime prevention objectives.  
 
                                                        
84  “Facial Recognition” (South Wales Police, 2017), https://www.south-wales.police.uk/en/adv 
ice/facial-recognition-technology/ [Accessed August 7, 2018]. 
85 London Policing Ethics Panel, Interim Report on Live Facial Recognition (2018), p.9. 
86 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No. 2) [2013] UKSC 39 at [92]; [2014] A.C. 700; [2013] 3 W.L.R. 
179; [2013] H.R.L.R. 30. 
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Success is not easy to measure in this context, particularly when relying on the limited 
statistical information about the trials that has been made publicly available. A low 
number of positive matches, which taken at face value might indicate that the 
technology is not very useful, could in fact represent an indication of success as the 
technology is effectively deterring those who might pose a threat to the public from 
attending gatherings where FRT surveillance is known to be in use. Notwithstanding 
this difficulty, both the SWP and MPS have defended, and appear committed to, their 
use of FRT surveillance. The former force suggested that the technology has led to 
numerous arrests and helped the force identify vulnerable people at times of crisis.87 
From the limited statistical data that has been published by the police, it is at least 
plausible to suggest that the use of FRT surveillance can make some contribution to 
crime control. The police have, after all, successfully identified people who are wanted 
in connection with criminal offences using FRT surveillance. However, in the face of 
the weighty impact that FRT surveillance will have on fundamental human rights, 
including the privacy interests people maintain as they occupy public space, the 
published results of the trials undertaken so far are insufficiently detailed to support the 
argument that its current use has been proportionate. They also raise troubling questions 
about the accuracy of the technology and its potential to undermine police legitimacy.  
 
Even if the technology is accurate enough to produce significant crime prevention 
benefits, there is good reason for restricting the use of FRT surveillance in public 
spaces. The preceding analysis suggests that any regulatory framework for the police 
use of overt FRT surveillance in public space should proceed on the basis that this 
surveillance interferes with the fundamental human rights of all who are subject to it, 
and that such interferences must be strictly necessary in response to a strong crime 
prevention or public safety based justification. This necessity principle suggests that a 
selective approach to the use of FRT surveillance in public space is required. Rather 
than gradually becoming a pervasive and chilling feature of public life, FRT 
surveillance should only be used in response to documented, credible and serious 
threats to public safety.  
 
                                                        
87  “Police defend facial recognition technology that wrongly identified 2,000 people as potential 
criminals” (The Telegraph, May 5, 2018), Telegraph.co.uk, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
2018/05/05/police-defend-facial-recognition-technology-wrongly-identified/ [Accessed July 15, 2018]. 
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Without the enactment of statutory rules governing the deployment of FRT 
surveillance, assessments of proportionality will remain in the hands of individual 
police forces. Parliament should set out rules governing the scope of the powers of the 
police to deploy FRT surveillance in public space to ensure consistency across police 
forces. The regulatory framework, as it is currently formulated, is insufficiently 
calibrated, permitting the trialling police forces to come up with divergent, and 
sometimes troubling, policies and practices for the execution of their FRT operations. 
The unique human rights based challenges posed by FRT surveillance require specific 
rules governing the scope of the powers of the police to use FRT surveillance, including 
minimum safeguards governing the composition of watch lists; the collection, 
processing and storage of personal information in this context; and the quality 
requirements of FRT systems and images for watch lists. 
 
We propose that particular care should be taken with the population of watch lists. 
Inclusion on a watch list involves further processing of personal information and, of 
course, the potential for additional risk of stigmatisation following a positive match. As 
a baseline standard, watch list inclusion should be reserved only for those individuals 
who are either: 
1) wanted in connection with a criminal offence; or  
2) otherwise reasonably believed to pose a serious risk to public safety (including 
the individual’s own safety); and  
3) in addition to 1 or 2, reasonably likely to be in the vicinity of the public space 
being monitored by FRT surveillance.   
 
Any regulatory framework should also ensure transparency and accountability in the 
police use of overt FRT surveillance by requiring any initiating police force to publicise 
its use of the surveillance during operations, and periodically publish information 
pertaining to the performance of the technology, including numbers of false positive 




The use of FRT surveillance is on the rise without sufficient reflection on its aims, and 
consequences. The ways in which FRT surveillance has the potential to interfere with 
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citizens’ privacy related rights are multifaceted and complex, and without a full 
understanding of this potential, we cannot hope to adequately regulate this form of 
policing technology. This paper has considered the impact of FRT surveillance from a 
fundamental human rights perspective, and has shown that the legal framework 
regulating these trials is piecemeal and fails to provide satisfactory rules and minimum 
safeguards governing the police use of FRT in public spaces. The extent to which police 
FRT surveillance can make a useful contribution to crime prevention and public safety 
objectives in England and Wales has yet to be ascertained. Like all surveillance 
technologies, it has the capacity to improve state oversight of individuals and 
populations, and like many other technologies, the drive for its wider use seems 
ineluctable, despite questionable reliability and inadequate reflection on its purposes. 
Aside from any crime control potential, and as this paper has demonstrated, human 
rights considerations should serve as a significant constraint on police FRT surveillance 
in public spaces. 
 
 
 
